Employment status: an ethical way forward for determining liability in tort and employment by Bennett, Michael
	

	 
 !∀#∃	 %%%&∋(
∃
))	∗)%+%%)
	
	
	
	
			
	
	
Employment Status: An Ethical Way
Forward for Determining Liability in
Tort and Employment
Dr Michael Bennett
Introduction
Identifying a contract of employment remains crucial in
determining whether and where legal liability falls. A contract of
employment (service) is essential for there to be vicarious liability in
tort. As a general rule, only employees ("servants") acting in the
course of employment will make the employer jointly and severally
liable for their torts. There is much dispute as to the justification for
vicarious liability, but it is recognised as a loss distribution service. I
The employer is more likely to have the means to compensate the
injured party. In most cases the burden will fall on an insurance
companl and then it can be argued it falls on all employers through
higher insurance premiums. Vicarious liability (famously described
by one judge as being based on "social convenience and rough
justice,,3) in practice does deliver remedies to injured parties and
turns on whether the tortfeasor is an employee.
Employment status has long been an essential tool for labour
lawyers4 and throughout the development of employment rights
during the second half of the twentieth century its importance has
remained. It was the device used to introduce the basic employment
rights to the wider workforce. Thus, the minimum periods of notice
and the right to a statement of terms, introduced by the Contracts of
Employment Act 1963, only applied to employees. Within eight
1 P S Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Tort (Butterworths: London, 1967), pp 12-28.
2 The employer is obliged to have insurance against injury to employees under the Employer's
Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969.
3 leI Ltd v Shatwell [1965] AC 656.
4 0 Kahn-Freund, in A Flanders and H Clegg (eds), The System of Industrial Relations in Great
Britain. (Basil Blackwell; Oxford, 1954), p 45.
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years rights to redundancy payments and not to be unfairly
dismissed had been added to employee rights. 5 Wedderburn, thus,
remarked in 1971 that for the English lawyer it is the "fundamental
institution, to which he is forced to return again and again".6 Since
then not only have there been significant developments in implied
terms through the courts,7 but there has been a mass of new statutory
rights, most of which are applicable to employees alone.
This article will focus on the concept of the contract of
employment. It is particularly concerned with vicarious liability in
tort and employment law, but, as necessary, will draw from income
tax and social security law. The article will argue that the current
definition does not serve us well because employment status has
become easy to avoid and, thus, rights are illusory. It will be
observed that there is pressure for the definition to differ, depending
on the form of action; it will be argued that this pressure ought to be
resisted for ethical reasons and to avoid the law becoming too
complex. Dworkin suggests that a state does not act ethically if it
fails to show "equal concern for the fate of all citizens".8 The article
argues that the United Kingdom (UK) is, so, failing in accepting that
a significant part of the workforce is excluded from rights others
take for granted. Self-employment is put forward as a concept that
might be easier to define and could be the way forward in the
interests ofjustice and clarity.
Statutory Guidance
No statute comprehensively defines an employer-employee
relationship. The Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948, the
statute that ended the common employment doctrine, made no
attempt at all. More recently statutes on employment rights tell us
that an employee is an individual who has entered into or works
under a contract of employment. The contract of employment in tum
5 Section I, Redundancy Payments Act 1965 and section 22, Industrial Relations Act 1971.
6 K W Wedderburn, Worker and the Law. 2'd edn (Penguin: Middlesex, 1971), pSI.
7 The duty not to destroy trust and confidence is an important example of such implied terms; see the
House of Lords' ruling in Malik v BCCl [1997] IRLR 462.
8 R Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 2000).
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is defined and, thus, section 230(2) Employment Rights Act 1996
states it is "a contract of service or apprenticeship, whether express
or implied, and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing".9 Thus,
the statutory guidance is very limited and circular in nature and, so,
the definition has been left to the courts. That development, which
has been long and complex, will not be tracked here, but an attempt
at summarising the current test follows.
Test for Employment
If there was any doubt as to which test is important today, it
was dispelled by Montgomery v Johnson Underwood,lo where
Buckley J, on behalf of a unanimous Court of Appeal, said that in
determining whether a contract of employment exists "the safest
starting point" and "the best guide" were the oft-quoted passage in
Ready-Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister ofPensions and
National Service, II where MacKenna ] had said:
A contract of service exists if these three conditions are
fulfilled. (l) The servant agrees that, in consideration of
remuneration, he will provide his own work and skill in
the performance of some service for his master. (2) He
agrees, expressly or impliedly, that in the performance of
that service he will be subject to the other's control in
sufficient degree to make that other master. (3) The other
provisions are consistent with it being a contract of
service.
Fashions for tests have varied over the years, but this approach, often
known as the Multiple Test, is clearly dominant now and has pushed
out the main opposition, the Economic Reality Test, discussed
below.
The meaning attributed to the judge's words has evolved over
the years to incorporate the notion of irreducible minimum. Within
9 Similar (but not identical) definitions appear in the Employer Liability (Defective Equipment) Act
1969 and the Employer Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969.
10 [2001] IRLR 269.
II [1968] I All ER 433.
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McKenna J's first two conditions are three absolute musts, mutual
obligations, personal performance and sufficient control. Only if
these essentials are there is a contract of employment possible, in
which case, under the third condition, all provisions are considered
to see if on balance they are consistent with such a contract.
Nethermere (St Neots) Ltd v Taverna and Gardiner l2 decided
that mutual obligations are an absolute must and the approach was
approved by the House of Lords in Carmichael v National Power. 13
Mutual obligations will usually be satisfied through a wage-work
bargain, but the requirement may amount to no more than the need
to have consideration in all contracts. 14
The second must, personal performance, will not be satisfied if
the worker can delegate his work to another. IS Exceptionally a
limited or occasional power of delegation will be overlooked. 16
The final part of the irreducible minimum is sufficient control.
What is sufficient is not defined and will tum on the particular facts,
but it is clear from Montgomery v Johnson Underwood that it cannot
be dispensed with altogether.
Test Applied
The fundamental flaw in the employment definition being very
prescriptive is that it is easy to evade. Thus, the employer, who
almost invariably will dictate the conditions under which he will
engage a worker, can, without trouble, make sure that he does not
create a contract of employment. So, although an employer cannot
exclude liability for unfair dismissal according to section 203,
Employment Rights Act 1996 and his ability to exclude liability for
negligence is severely restricted by section 2, Unfair Contract Terms
Act 1977, he can effectively avoid liability by making sure the
irreducible minimum is not met.
12 [1984] lRLR 240.
13 [2000] lRLR 43.
14 Cotswold Developments Construction Ltd v Williams [2006] IRLR 181.
15 Express and Echo Puhlications Ltd v Tanton [1999] lRLR 367.
16 MacFarlane v Glasgow City Council [2001] IRLR 7.
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Perhaps the simplest way to avoid employment status is for the
employer to make sure there is a lack of mutual obligations. The
case of Carmichael v National Power provides a straightforward
model, where the power station guides were employed "on a casual
as required basis". In recent years where no paid employment was
guaranteed, the relationship was frequently described as a zero-hours
contract. The growth of such contracts was noted by the White
Paper, Fairness at Work, 17 which estimated that there were 20,000
such arrangements in the UK. Given further growth, the workers
falling foul of the mutuality rule must be a significant part of the
workforce. Of course, to the employer there is the downside to these
arrangements in that, without an enforceable contract, he cannot be
assured of the worker's labour. At times an employer would be ill-
advised to leave himself so exposed that he could not insist on the
worker's performance. But in practice, if he has a sufficiently large
pool of workers, this downside will not cause problems. Thus, the
weaker the bargaining position of the workers, the less likely is it
that the law will protect them.
Two particular devices have been used to find mutual
obligations, where on the face of it there is a zero-hours contract.
First, an umbrella or global contract might exist which governs the
whole relationship. Thus, the homeworkers in Nethermere were
treated as employees, because the giving and taking of work over the
period had hardened into an enforceable contract. How exactly this
works has never been explained, but it seems likely to be defeated by
an employer clearly expressing his intention to avoid any obligation
to employ. The second device is more convincing. It can be argued a
casual worker with each engagement works under a contract of
employment, that the gaps between engagements could be ignored as
being temporary cessations of work (through section 212(3)(b)
Employment Rights Act 1996) and that there is a continuous period
under a contact of employment. 18 In spite of this scope for argument
casual workers have generally failed to prove employment status and
would need expert legal advice to establish such a relationship.
A contract that clearly allows the worker to delegate his duties
to another could successfully avoid employment status. This is a less
17 1998 em. 3968.
18 Cornwall County Council v Prater [2006] IRLR 362.
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attractive route for most employers, who see selection of their
workforce as vital.
Another way of avoiding employment status is to engage
agency staff. The Conduct of Employment Agencies and
Employment Business Regulations 2003 19 require employment
agencies to issue its workers with a written statement of terms and
conditions, which indicates whether the agency regards them as self-
employed or employees. Statute treats such workers as employees
for tax and national insurance purposes,20 but otherwise their status
turns on the usual rules. An attempt at establishing employment
status will often fail as the irreducible minimum does not exist
between the agency worker and either the agency or the end
user/client employer. Frequently there will be mutual obligations
between the agency and worker, but insufficient control; the day to
day control exercised by the end user may be sufficient, but there
will usually be a lack of mutual obligations with the worker. Thus
agency workers, estimated by the DTI21 to be 700,000 in number in
2001 and still growing, are unlikely to be employees.
The chink of light for agency workers is the willingness of the
Court of Appeal to find an implied contract between the worker and
end user. In Dacas v Brook Street Bureau22 the possibility of
inferring the existence of an employment contract between the
worker and end user was discussed. This approach was adopted by
an employment tribunal and approved by the Court of Appeal in
Cable and Wireless pIc v Muscat?3 As long as the remuneration was
being provided by the end user, it mattered not whether it was paid
directly or indirectly. The latter case was a particularly strong one as
Muscat had been directly employed before the re-arrangement
involving the agency. It has been suggested the concept of implied
19 Sl 2003/33 I9.
20 Part 2, ch 7, Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003, and ss 2 and 6, Social Securities and
Benefits Act 1992.
21 Department of Trade and Industry, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the
Council on Working Conditions of Temporary Agency Workers: Regulatory Impact Assessment (2000),
www.dti.gov.uk/files/file30165.pdf(30/10106).
22 [2004] IRLR 358.
23 [2006] IRLR 354.
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contract would be difficult to defend where the worker has been
introduced by the agency to the end user.24 In fact the President of
the Employment Appeal Tribunal in James v London Borough of
Greenwich25 ruled that an implied contract is confined to rare cases.
But, we must wait and see how the case law develops.
Once the irreducible minimum is established, a court or
tribunal should look at all the provisions to see if they are consistent
with a contract of employment. Such matters as level of control,
provision of tools, method of payment and form of taxation are
discussed. Employment tribunals frequently list all the factors
suggesting employment, and those that do not, in order to help them
come to a decision. The provisions, including any title attached to
the relationship, are only persuasive and what weight should be
given to any particular provision is difficult to ascertain. The
uncertainty is heightened by the ruling that the question of
employment status is generally a question of fact; only where a
tribunal adopts the wrong law or is guilty of perversity should an
appellate tribunal or court intervene.26 Thus, there is the potential for
one set of facts to lead to different conclusions with the appellate
bodies being unable to intervene.
Tax Solution
Self-employed people have considerable tax advantages over
employees. Not only do they pay tax much later, but a wider range
of expenses is allowed against income and a lower rate of national
insurance contributions is payable. People have naturally tried to put
themselves in a better tax position and the Inland Revenue has
responded by attempting to close loopholes.
The building industry has long been associated with sham self-
employment and the consequent lack of employment rights?7 The
Inland Revenue's answer has been to put the onus on the individual
24 F Reynold, 'The Status of Agency Workers: A Question of Legal Principle", (2006) 35(3),
Industrial Law Journal, 320-323.
25 [2007] IRLR 168.
26 Above, note 13.
27 P Brown, Report o[Committee Inquiry (1968), Cmnd 3714.
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worker to prove he is truly self-employed. Thus, contractors, in
making payments to sub-contractors, must deduct tax, unless the
sub-contractor produces a certificate showing he is entitled to a gross
payment. The key to entitlement to gross pay is being able to
demonstrate you are genuinely carrying on your own business,
according to section 60 of, and schedule 11 to, the Finance Act 2004.
The uncertainty as regards agency workers does not extend to
taxation. They are treated, whatever their status, as employees of the
agency and tax is deducted PAYE or Pay As You Earn, according to
Part 2, chapter 7 of the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act
2003. In spite of this legislation there still remained those avoiding
tax by providing their services through an intermediary. The
intermediary would normally be a company and money would be
extracted in the form of a dividend. PAYE would not apply and no
National Insurance contributions would be payable.28 This led to a
budget statement and press release number IR35, explaining new
anti-avoidance legislation/9 which involves the creation of a
hypothetical contract. This applies where a worker personally
performs services for another, the client, and the services are
provided through an intermediary. If, without the intermediary, there
would be a contract of employment between the worker and client,
the legislation bites and the worker is taxed in a similar way to an
employee.
The lack of statutory guidance on employment status, thus,
does not present such problems to revenue law due to its tailor-made
measures. The law can at times be used to give tax benefits. Thus, to
encourage divers and their supervisors to explore the seabed for oil
and gas, section 314, Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988
dictates that such workers are taxed as self-employed workers. But,
the legislation, having the greatest impact, aims to treat workers
generally as employees. Income tax, raised in a consistent and
universal way, has long been regarded as a fair way of raising
revenue. 30 By closing the loopholes the Inland Revenue is aiming to
28 HM Revenue and Customs, Intermediaries Legislation (IR35), Background, (2006),
www.hmrc.gov.uklir35 (23/10/06).
29 Part 2, ch 8, Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003, and Social Security Contributions
(Intermediaries) Regulations 2000 (SI 2000/727).
30 A Smith, Wealth ofNations (1776), www.adamsmith.org/smith/won-intro.htm(26/10/06).
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make taxation consistent and universal and, thus, taxation becomes
fairer, but the legal system as a whole becomes less fair. Tax law
does not resolve the true legal relationship; the worker mayor may
not be an employee. If he is not an employee, his employer will not
be vicariously liable and he will not be entitled to many employment
rights, but he will have to pay tax as an employee. Personally the
worker will have the bad, but none of the good, consequences of
employment status.
Tort Solution
Without legislation vicarious liability in tort seems to be taking
its own path or paths. Still leading texts describe the tests to
determine employment status on the basis that the tests are the same
for tort and employment law.3 ! But, it has been argued that
employment status should depend on the legal question asked.
McKendrick32 argued that vicarious liability was the most efficient
method of ensuring the injured party is compensated. The employer
is closely associated with the tort as it is committed in the course of
his business and he can distribute loss through increased insurance
premiums by raising the price of the product. McKendrick saw
nothing irrational in classifying a worker as an employee for the
purposes of vicarious liability, but not for the purposes of other areas
of law.
There has been concern that judges tended to treat safety cases
more seriously and, thus, were more likely to find employment
status. This for some33 was confirmed by the words of Henry LJ in
Lane v Shire Roofing Company (Oxford) LtcJ4:
When it comes to the question of safety at work, there is
a real public interest in recognising the
employer/employee relationship when it exists, because
31 W V H Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, 17'h edn (Sweet and Maxwell: London, 2006), p 884.
32 E McKendrick, "Vicarious Liability and Independent Contractors - A re-examination", (1990) 53
Modern Law Review, 770-784.
33 See G Pitt, Employment Law, 5'h edn (Sweet and Maxwell: London, 1997), pp 66-67.
34 [1995] IRLR 493, 496.
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of the responsibilities that the common law and statutes
such as the Employer's Liability (Compulsory
Insurance) Act 1969 places on the employer.
Another view could be that the judge was simply stating how
important the case was before him; he certainly did not say
employment rights were less important.
Doubts over the views of the judiciary were allayed by Sedley
LJ in Dacas v Brook Street Bureau (UK) Ltd. 35 In this unfair
dismissal claim the judge thought the conclusion that a cleaner
working through an agency was employed by nobody was not
credible. He argued that if the case had related to the negligence of
the cleaner, the High Court or a county court would almost certainly
have found the client employer vicariously liable. The client
employer would need to prove the cleaner was employed by another
or nobody to escape liability, and this was thought to be very
unlikely. The judge commented that counsel, advancing a
submission that the cleaner worked under something other than a
contract of employment and that in consequence the Council should
escape vicariously liability, "could look forward to a bad day in
court". Sedley LJ was clearly not happy taking a different approach
depending on the type of case and agreed with Mummery LJ that,
had the client employer been a party to the appeal, an implied
contract of employment might have been established.
The Court of Appeal in Hawley v Luminar Leisure plc36
confirmed that liability in such circumstances depends on control. A
doorman, supplied by an agency to a night club run by Luminar
Leisure, struck an innocent customer and caused permanent brain
damage. The High Court followed Mersey Docks and Harbour
Board v Coggins and Griffiths,37 where the House of Lords had
decided that, when an employee was loaned by the permanent
employer to another, that permanent employer would be liable unless
he proved control had passed to the other. The judge in Hawley
explained that in the context of deemed temporary employment the
paramount test is that of control and on the facts the night club was
35 Above, note 23.
36 [2006] IRLR 817.
37 [1947] AC 1.
13
liable. A unanimous Court of Appeal confirmed this approach and
decided the judge was quite entitled to find that Luminar Leisure had
become the deemed employer. This case can be seen largely as a
reiteration of the principle established in the Mersey Docks case, but
it can also be seen as confirmation of the judicial attitude described
by Sedley LJ in Dacas. The doorman in Hawley was treated as an
employee although, given he was an agency worker and largely
controlled by the end user, there was the potential for this
assumption to be challenged. Vicarious liability seemed inevitable in
this case and the main issue to decide was on which employer
liability should fall. Vicarious liability fell on the end user, who
exercised detailed control over the doormen.
The case law shows an intention to put vicarious liability on
the shoulders of the appropriate employer, but the legal reasoning is
ambiguous. The idea that there is an implied contract with the end
user may establish employment status for all purposes; alternatively,
the idea that control is needed for vicarious liability determines tort
liability, but leaves many questions unanswered as regards
employment status.
Employment Law Solution
Certain employment rights are now given to, not only
employees but also, those defined by statute as workers. A statutory
worker (as opposed to the broad but inexact term, "worker") is,
according to section 230(3), Employment Rights Act 1996, an
individual who has entered into or works under:
(a) a contract of employment, or
(b) any other contract, whether express or implied and (if
it is express) whether oral or in writing, whereby the
individual undertakes to do or perform personally any
work or services for another party to the contract whose
status is not by virtue of the contract that of a client or
customer of any profession or business undertaking
carried on by the individual.
Discrimination law protection in employment is similarly, but not
identically, extended beyond employees.
The statutory worker definition essentially requires both a
14
contract and personal performance, and excludes a person running
his own business. Bow broad this definition is will depend on the
way it is applied by the tribunals and courts. The detailed
consideration in Byrne Bros (Formwork) v Baircf8 led the
Employment Appeal Tribunal to decide that mutuality of obligations
was as much an essential for a statutory worker as for an employee.
No rationale was offered for importing this term into the statutory
worker definition, but the judge stated it was an essential in all
contracts and, thus, seemed to be identifying the concept of
consideration to prove there was a contract.39 Given that casual
workers have frequently failed to prove employment status because
of the lack of mutual obligations, it is a concern it may prevent
statutory worker status being established.40 Perhaps this was
inevitable as long as the statute demands a contract. Similar concerns
arise from the requirement of personal service. The key may be
whether the tribunals and courts, as in Byrne Bros, attempt to take a
purposive approach and protect those who are in a subordinate and
dependent position. Certainly they should recognise shams and not
be distracted by clauses introduced to avoid statutory worker status.
In determining the meaning of the term, worker, for the
purposes ofArticle 141 of the EC Treaty on Equal Pay, the European
Court of Justice, in Allonby v Accrington and Rosedale College,41
said it should not be interpreted restrictively, but did not include
independent providers of services, who were not in a subordinate
position. It meant a person who, for a certain period of time,
performed services for, and under the direction of, another person, in
return for which he received remuneration. This definition, without
notions of contract and mutuality, has much to commend it and
hopefully will influence development in the UK.
Statutory workers now have important protection, which
includes legislation on unlawful deductions, working time and
minimum pay. Considerable hope was raised when a government
38 [2002] IRLR 96.
39 See Cotswold Developments Construction Ltd v Williams, above, note 14.
40 See D. Brodie, "Employees, Workers and the Self-employed", (2005) 34(3) Industrial Law Journal,
253-260.
41 [2004] ICR 1328.
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working party was set up to see if rights such as unfair dismissal
should be extended to statutory workers.42 This review's conclusions
have now been published and no extension of rights is proposed.43
The Government was concerned that change might undermine
flexibility. It concluded that the current legal framework reflects the
wide diversity of working arrangements and the different levels of
responsibility and rights in different employment relationships. So,
at present the concept of statutory worker, which has no relevance to
tort, is unlikely to deliver enhanced employment rights.
Ethical Solution
The problem from an ethical point of view is that the law
imposes responsibility on the shoulders of the employer, but such
responsibility is easy to avoid. In fact the greater the imbalance
between employer and worker power, the more likely the employer
is able to escape responsibility. Tax, tort and employment law are all
developing devices to close loopholes with some success, but, if this
continues, the law, already complex, will be inaccessible to all but a
handful of experts.
In employment law, as the number of employment rights
expands, the moral dilemma increases year by year. Members of our
society are excluded from rights others take for granted. Equality, in
a Dworkin sense, is lacking. The law and the state are failing in not
showing "equal concern for the fate of all citizens".44 In doing this,
an underclass is created. Perhaps this is not so serious for those who
temporarily work under such conditions as many students do; what
is serious is the reality for many that the only alternative to
unemployment is labour without security or other rights.
The history of attempts at defining employment status is
complex because of differing views. Where there is much agreement
is how to treat a person in business on his own account. Thus, the
rule 35 legislation aims to close loopholes in taxation law, but will
42 Department of Trade and Industry, Discussion Document on Employment Status (2002).
www.dti.gov.uk/fiIeslfile27471.pdf(23/10106).
43 Department of Trade and Industry, Success at Work: Protecting Vulnerable Workers. Supporting
Good Employers (2006), www.dti.gov.uk/fileslfile27469.pdf(23/10106).
44 Above, note 8.
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not treat as an employee any person who is genuinely carrying on his
own business. In a similar way the statutory worker definition
excludes those carrying on a business undertaking. A way forward
could be to clearly define a person in business, while attaching
employee rights and responsibilities to other workers.
In the American case, US v Silk,45 the Supreme Court asked
whether workers were employees "as a matter of economic reality".
The judges went on to decide that drivers, who owned their own
trucks, were in fact "small businessmen". A year later, Lord Wright,
in the Privy Council case, Montreal Locomotive Works Ltd v
Montreal and Attorney General for Canada,46 explained that all
elements should be examined and said:
In this way it is in some cases possible to decide the
issue by raising as the crucial question whose business is
it, or in other words by asking whether the party is
carrying on the business, in the sense of carrying it on
himself or on his behalf and not merely for a superior.
These authorities were cited not only in the Ready Mixed case47 but
also in Market Investigations v Minister of Social Security,48 where
Cooke J asked if a person was "in business on his own account". He
thought no exhaustive list could be compiled of relevant
considerations to determine the question, but stated:
The most that can be said is that control will no doubt
always have to be considered, although it can no longer
be regarded as the sole determining factor; and that
factors which may be of importance are such matters as
whether the man performing services provides his own
equipment, whether he hires his own helper, what degree
of financial risk he takes, what degree of responsibility
for financial investment management he has, and
45 (J 946) 331 us 704.
46 [1947] IDLR 161.
47 Above, note II.
48 [1968] 2 All ER 732.
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whether and how far he has an opportunity of profiting
from sound management in the performance of his task.
Cooke J's observations have been cited with approval by the High
Court, Court of Appeal and Privy Council.49 Importantly,
Mummery J, in Hall v Lorimer,50 emphasised the need to avoid
check lists and advised that you should stand back to gain a
qualitative appreciation of the whole.
Asking if a person is "in business on his own account" tells us
too little as it begs too many questions, ie, it is not dissimilar to
asking whether a person is self-employed. Still, as with all tests, the
essentials need articulating, as Cooke J attempted. This was picked
up by the Court ofAppeal in Lane v Shire Roofing,51 where Henry J,
quoting Silk's question as to whether the men were employees "as a
matter of economic reality", said:
The answer to this question may cover much of the same
ground as the control test (such as whether he hires his
own equipment and hires his own helpers) but may
involve looking to see where the financial risk lies, and
whether and how far he has an opportunity of profiting
from sound management in the performance of his task.
The test concentrates on the definition of self-employment rather
than employment status and, thus, identifies who is not entitled to
employment rights and will not make another vicariously liable.
Identifying risk and opportunity for profit as key indicators means
that a high degree of independence is sought.
The concept of a person, who bears the risk and has an
opportunity for profit, coincides both with the popular understanding
of the entrepreneur and with the Marxist view of the capitalist
gaining surplus value. 52 Such a person would not include a hotel
worker on an hourly rate under a zero-hours contract; it would not
49 Hall (HM Inspector of Taxes) v Lorimer [1994] IRLR 171; Ferguson v Dawson & Partners [1976] 1
WLR 1213; Lee ring Sang v Chung Chi-Keung [1990] ICR 409.
50 Above, note 50.
51 Above, note 35, 496.
52 E Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory (Merlin: London, 1972).
include a building worker on an hourly rate even where substitution
is a possibility under the contract. The easy escape route provided by
the Multiple Test and the irreducible minimum is lacking.
The Economic Reality Test is clearly likely to embrace a
person investing considerable sums in a business, but such
investment is not essential. The person delivering the professional
services to a variety of employers may not invest a substantial sum
in the business, but, in operating in this way, he takes financial risks
and has the opportunity to profit. The variety of employers would
help to indicate his independence.53
For many the nature of employment is fast changing. A high
premium is placed on flexibility and in the knowledge-based
economl4 and the courts have supported this approach by placing a
duty on employees to adapt.55 At the same time, highly skilled
employees, given their expertise, often work with limited
supervision. Such persons' income, partly or wholly, depends on the
success of the business. This independence at work and dependence
on the success of the business does not necessarily lead to a
conclusion of self-employment. This would only occur if he took it
upon himself to be responsible for the management and profitability
of a business. A court or tribunal would have to decide whether the
risk carried was more appropriate to an employee or independent
contractor.
The Economic Reality Test is clearly not dominant today. The
Court of Appeal's judgement in Nethermere which has received the
House of Lords' approval, clearly rejects the argument that it is the
"fundamental test". It ruled that it would only be applicable where
there is a choice between a contract of service and contract for
services, explaining that there could be a third type of contract or no
contract at all. In spite of it not being currently in favour, we would
be unwise to forget too quickly a test that identifies the key elements
of being in business and prevents the unethical evasion of legal
responsibility.
53 See Hall (HM Inspector ofTaxes) v Lorimer.
54 H Collins, "Regulating the Employment Relation for Competitiveness", (200 I) 30( I) Industrial Law
Journal, 17-47.
55 Creswell v Inland Revenue [1984] lCR 508.
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Conclusion
The key concern, that employment status is easy for an
employer to evade, remains. The Government, proud of its success
in achieving full employment goals, celebrates the wide diversity of
working arrangements and the different legal relationships.56 In
deciding against extending employment rights to statutory workers,
it adopts the employer view that reform was likely to result in a
reduction in temporary work and a lack of permanent work to
replace it. This is unconvincing as the main unfair dismissal right is
only available to those employed for more than a year. It is unlikely
that many truly temporary contracts need to last for a year or more.
In spite of this the Government sees labour market flexibility as the
key and rejects reform.
Clearly the reality in the UK and elsewhere in Europe is a
variety of employment relationships,S? but the answer is not to define
minutely each relationship. This would lead to complexity far
beyond our current experience and is likely to be unworkable. The
ethical solution is to consider who has the shoulders to bear both the
burden of vicarious liability and the burden of no employment
rights. These burdens, the author believes, should only fall on those
who are truly in business on their own account. The key to this status
is having the opportunity for profit and the risk of loss. With
appropriate adaptation to include not-for-profit organisations, the
Economic Reality Test does offer the best hope of a definition that
can inform different areas of law and avoid complexity.
Dr Michael Bennett
University of Portsmouth
56 See above, note 44.
57 M Freedland, "From the Contract of Employment to the Personal Work Nexus", (2006) 35( I)
Industrial Law Journal, 1-29.
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